Published on Jan.7 ,2014 : The Denki shinbun(The Electric Daily News)
Dr. Michio Ishikawa
Chief Adviser(Former President & CEO of JANTI

Although it may not be a perfect topic for the New Year, only a little over ten percent of the evacuees from Fukushima wanted to go home according to an investigative report published last year. It is the way of the world that the farther you are away from home, the harder it is for you to go back home. However, this figure is extremely worse than that of those who were evacuated from Miyake Island due to volcanic gas, in which case over 60% of evacuees have returned home.

One of the reasons is the fact that decontamination below 1mSv/year has not been completed yet, which is not acceptable to the evacuees given the society is allergic to radioactivity. Another is the way of life these people, young and old, have become used to, including schools, jobs, and welfare infrastructures. This problem cannot be solved easily. It is probably a tough issue for the local governments concerned.

The problem of decontamination below 1mSv/year began when Minister Hosono and Governor Sato of Fukushima Prefecture made a promise to achieve this level of decontamination. It is said that many of the evacuees are convinced that it is dangerous to go back home unless such decontamination is realized. However, it is hardly possible and costly to restore the natural level of radiation through decontamination. It takes a long time for radioactivity to decay. That is why they cannot go back home.

Although there is no other way than changing the promise to realize their early return home, the promise made between the politicians can only be taken care of by the politicians themselves.

How about the emergency evacuation that has given rise to the problem of return home?

It was after 9:00 p.m. when the evacuation order was issued to the residents within a three-kilometer radius around the power station. The radiation dose rate measured near the main gate of the power station was not different from the ordinary level. Evacuation was not necessary at all. Staying home was appropriate.

In the early next morning (March 12), evacuation was expanded to a ten-kilometer radius. The dose measured then was approximately 20mSv/year, which later became a criterion for evacuation. Since the radiation dose in the distant ten-kilometer zone was much lower than that measured near the main gate, the residents in that zone did not have to be evacuated.

Evacuation was not necessary until after the midnight of three days later, March 14. The radiation dose rose around the power station due to the meltdown of Unit 2 and subsequent vessel damage. The government’s evacuation orders were too early.

As they were too early, evacuation was forced without plans. Evacuees were put on cars without preparations. They were caught in traffic due to evacuation rush without even being told where they were going. According to the report put together by the Diet investigation committee, some 60 people from hospitals and senior care homes lost their lives during the evacuation.

Why did the government make haste to force such unreasonable evacuation? Rumors are that Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) requested that the people be evacuated before venting is performed. It is probably true. TEPCO’s unreasonable request operated as part of the tragedy.

However, it is the government who was responsible for the evacuation orders. They decided the evacuation zone just by the distance from the power station without even measuring radiation and setting evacuation dose criteria. It was a sloppy, senseless decision even in an emergency.

This senseless evacuation was ordered because the prime minister’s office had no experts knowledgeable about radiation disasters. The absence of experts occurred because the safety commission did not convene an emergency advisory organization.

Japan has a plenty of radiation experts. If an advisory organization had been launched in accordance with the emergency procedure, experts could have gathered together at any cost. The evacuation dose criteria could have been established immediately and dose measurement could have been carried out to determine the evacuation zone. I used to be one of them.

If so, forced evacuation would not have taken place until the midnight of March 14. No evacuation would have been forced in areas where the evacuation dose criteria were not met. Consequently, the number of evacuees would have been reduced sharply and no one would have been dead because of well-planned evacuation.

The less people are evacuated, the more people stay at home. If people had stayed, the infrastructures devastated by the earthquake would have been restored immediately and the rehabilitation of Fukushima would have been promoted keeping up with other prefectures.

Now, today’s problem of evacuees is attributable to the responsibility of the safety commission (government) that was thrown into confusion and did not abide by the emergency procedure.Why is the vocal media not aware of this to pursue the point of responsibility? Is it also due to confusion?

Three years have passed since the accident. Instead of my New Year’s greetings, I wish for the evacuees who would love to go home this year to get the all clear to do so.

end