Published on Mar.8 ,2013 : The Denki shinbun(The Electric Daily News)
Dr. Michio Ishikawa
Chief Adviser(Former President & CEO of JANTI

In the two previous articles (1) and (2) issued on November 19, 2012 and January 21, 2013, respectively, I highlighted technical on-site issues that were present in the Fukushima accident. This article shifts the focus onto issues in Tokyo. There were so many serious issues that resulted from lack of common sense.

The most serious issue was the government cover-up of the Section B.5.b notice from the United States. Following the 9.11 terrorist attacks, the U.S. government issued an order to formulate strategies against possible attacks on nuclear sites, and sent confidential communication to countries with nuclear energy operations around the world in around 2003, prompting them to urgently reinforce emergency power supplies at nuclear sites. This is commonly referred to as B5b, based on the section number of the U.S. order.

Upon receiving B5b, many countries revamped power supplies at their nuclear sites. However, the Japanese government kept the U.S. communication secret, and did not even recommend that nuclear licensees take action. If the recommendation had been enforced, the Fukushima accident could have been prevented. The cover-up of B5b is not lack of common sense, but rather lack of justice.

The second issue is the lack of planning in forcing the evacuation of local residents. Public opinions seem to support the early evacuation, but there was no need for evacuation until March 15 in terms of the amount of radiation present.

The preparation and planning for evacuation should start from the day of an accident, but its enforcement can wait until the status of radiation is confirmed. The fact that two elderly people died in the traffic congestion caused by evacuation, is proof that the evacuation lacked proper planning. The SPEEDI system issue is another piece of evidence.

Professionals should allow sufficient time in evacuation when it comes to a nuclear accident. There is grave responsibility about the ill-prepared enforcement of evacuation.

For the third issue, let us reflect on the Russo-Japanese War, in which the government concentrated on securing funds and an early peace accord, while leaving the strategies of battle entirely to the Marshal Iwao Oyama. This national unity led the nation to victory.

In contrast, at the time of the accident, the Cabinet members, bureaucrats and TEPCO leaders not only sought on-site information from the general manager Yoshida of the Fukushima plant, but also issued instructions as to what he should do. The government leaders, who were supposed to be supporting on-site workers, turned into a group of authoritarian intruders with no wisdom or determination for giving support.

For example, since the power station was struggling with the loss of electricity, the government should have ordered SDF to install makeshift power supplies. The availability of power could have saved Unit 2 and Unit 3. The officials gathered at the Prime Minister's Official Residence did not have the common sense that even small children could have come up with.

The fourth issue was the fact that media announcements released through NHK, delivered by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano, NISA bureaucrats and Tokyo University professors, were littered with mistakes and cover-ups until the acting CFO Matsumoto of TEPCO began appearing one and a half months later. The Nuclear Safety Commission exposed its lack of accurate information, and was dubbed Mr. Hogwash.

President Jimmy Carter had undergone training for operating a nuclear submarine, yet assigned the Director Denton of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission to the task of general command at the time of the TMI accident. The Director established full grasp of the accident, and conveyed his understanding of the event to media. This helped calm down the public sentiments at the time. His sharp insight reinforced public confidence in USNRC, which remains to be the most trusted bureaucratic body in the United States.

Allowing pseudo-experts to appear on TV caused the entire nuclear industry in Japan to lose public confidence. Young experts with solid knowledge on nuclear energy have been pushed away from the public eye, and nuclear plants continued to be in the irresponsible state of shutdown. This is an extremely unfortunate situation for Japan.

The fifth issue is NISA's inappropriate regulatory approach, which formed the background for the rise of persons with no solid knowledge. In the typical mentality of "Japan as No.1", NISA ignored safety activities of other countries and applied hypocritical and unfounded philosophy of "quality assurance = safety" to nuclear regulations over a decade.

Consequently, the attitude of learning about nuclear safety disappeared from power stations, while station personnel were forced to chase after the fine prints of quality assurance regulations. It was under this condition that the accident occurred. Underlying the on-site issues I highlighted in the previous article was the mentality at the power stations, generated by the inappropriate safety regulations.

These five issues are serious problems that occurred in Tokyo. These outnumber the technical issues experienced at the power station.

Some say the Fukushima accident was a man-made disaster. However, the primary causes of the accident were tsunami and extended loss of off-site power. Without these factors, there would never have been the accident. This list of issues in emergency only represents secondary causes of the accident.

Government officials were looking all innocent, while calling the accident a man-made disaster and accusing TEPCO as the sole responsible party. Isn't that against the concept of social justice? These actions should be re-examined by the current government.

This article concludes the series of 15 articles on the Fukushima accident I have contributed since the accident in March 2011.

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